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 SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES:  
ANYTHING BUT SAFE 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
ACCEPTANCE LETTER 
 
Amanda Richey 
 
 
 
“Sticks and stones may break my bones but words can 
never hurt me.” The sentiment behind the popular nursery 
rhyme animates debates over “safe spaces” and “trigger 
warnings” in higher education, as rivals disagree over the extent 
to which students should feel protected in their diversity of 
identities and experiences. Opponents view these speech 
policies as opportunities for individuals to “retreat from ideas 
and perspectives at odds with their own,” and as fundamentally 
counterproductive to informed debate.1 
These arguments become more interesting when ana-
lyzed in media markets. Complex issues of academic freedom, 
student speech, and respect of difference are condensed and 
often expurgated through pundit quips about “politically correct 
(PC) culture.” Until recently, the body of work concerning this 
cultural moment was largely confined to academic circles; after 
all campus speech obviously concerns campuses. Inside Higher 
Ed and The Chronicle of Higher Education mention the term 
“safe space” in featured articles from the mid 2000s forward 
and the 1990s forward, respectively.2 These narrow debates 
                                                
1 Ellison, 2016, lines 14 - 15 
2https://www.insidehighered.com/search/site/%22safe%20spaces%22
?page=9  
and 
http://www.chronicle.com/search?q=safe+space&published_date=3_o
r_more_years (accessed December 3, 2016). 
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gained public traction in November 2015 when volatile race 
relations at the University of Missouri, stemming from Black 
Lives Matter advocacy, created scenes for mass media circula-
tion (including Melissa Click’s muscular “enforcement” of free 
speech spaces even against student media coverage).3 Later that 
year, worries about cultural appropriation and free expression 
in Halloween costumes at Yale only compounded the concern 
that universities had become unhinged in their handling of 
student speech.4 These examples provided conservative pundits 
fodder for news stories that “liberal indoctrination” had 
convinced most faculty and students that their identity perfor-
mances were more important than rigorous or thoughtful 
debate. “The Coddling of the American Mind,” published in 
The Atlantic in the fall of 2015, helped frame public concern in 
one cohesive narrative: college students are hiding from or even 
actively opposing ideas that make them uncomfortable. This 
narrative, in addition to contemporary news stories, entered a 
polarized media landscape demarcated by partisan alliances.  
A seemingly innocuous acceptance letter, directed to 
students in the Class of 2020 from the University of Chicago’s 
Dean of Students in The College, also entered this media 
environment. The letter gained prominent coverage in main-
stream American media in August of 2016 for its firm condem-
nation of “intellectual safe spaces” and “trigger warnings.” The 
acceptance letter reinvigorated discussion about safe spaces, 
both within academic circles and within a broader public. While 
the letter could simply be read as a formal introduction to 
campus speech norms, or a marketing stunt to spread the 
University of Chicago’s name, it also represents a renewed lay 
                                                
3 Conor Friedersdorf, "Campus Activists Weaponize 'Safe Space,'" 
The Atlantic, November 10 2015. 
4Anemona Hartocollis, "Yale Lecturer Resigns After Email on 
Halloween Costumes," The New York Times, 7 December 2015. 
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3 
interest in free speech regulation and identity on American 
college campuses.  
This essay will analyze the University of Chicago ac-
ceptance letter as the latest text to enter a body of work in the 
American public addressing campus speech and speech 
protection. After an overview of the cultural history of Ameri-
can campus speech concerns, the rhetorical situation will be 
described to better illuminate the Dean’s possible intentions 
under the specific conditions. Next, the essay moves to an 
analysis of the dominant ideographs and structural elements 
within the University of Chicago text, followed by a compari-
son with other college acceptance letters. Finally, the essay will 
outline the initial response to the University of Chicago letter 
and indicate the potential significance of the text to the contem-
porary cultural moment.  
 
From Movements to Codes to “Coddling:” 
The Cultural Context  
 
The text’s condemnation of trigger warnings and intel-
lectual safe spaces emerged from a recurring cultural fascina-
tion with the regulation of American campus speech that goes 
back 50 years. The 1960s are renowned for student activism  — 
from the civil rights movement to the anti-war movement. 
However, one movement in the fall of 1964 specifically 
addressed students’ rights to free speech, and “was the first 
major campus rebellion” of the decade, according to one 
scholar.5 The Free Speech Movement at the University of 
California, Berkeley united thousands of students, and eventu-
ally gained extensive faculty support, against the university’s 
president and deans for restricting political advocacy on 
campus. After three months of sit-ins and rallies, faculty in the 
                                                
5Robby Cohen, "Berkeley Free Speech Movement: Paving the Way 
for Campus Activism." OAH Magazine of History 1, no. 1 (April 1, 
1985):16. 
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Academic Senate voted to vindicate student leaders facing 
administrative backlash and endorsed the movement’s underly-
ing principle that the “‘content of speech or advocacy should 
not be restricted by the university.’” 
In the 1980s and 1990s, national coverage of campus 
speech shifted to the defense of college’s brand reputation, as 
public funding decreased and pressure to compete nationally 
increased. Racist incidents gained broad exposure, with the help 
of recently created 24-hour cable news channels. In response, 
campuses created policy punishing intentionally derogatory 
language in “hate speech codes.”  The necessity of hate speech 
codes, beyond normal student conduct procedures, worried 
students and faculty,6 and lawyers questioned the constitution-
ality of these policies.7 According to Gould, by the mid- to late-
1990s hate speech policies had “actually increased in number 
following a series of court decisions that ostensibly found many 
to be unconstitutional.”8 The American Association of Univer-
sity Professors (AAUP) published a statement cautioning 
against the use of campus speech codes in the July 1992 issue 
of Academe, the association’s peer reviewed journal. The 
statement warned against speech codes and the slippery slope 
they might create “to differentiate between high-value and low-
value speech, or to choose which groups are to be protected by 
curbing the speech of others.”9 Further, the statement reaf-
firmed the importance of freedom of expression and, at the very 
least, toleration of ideas that members of academic communi-
                                                
6Charles R. Lawrence, "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus." Duke Law Journal, no. 3 (1990): 434. 
7 Jon B. Gould, "The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech 
Codes and the Two Faces of Legal Compliance." Law & amp Society 
Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 345. 
8 Ibid. 
9 American Association of University Professors. "On Freedom of 
Expression and Campus Speech Codes." Academe 78, no. 4 (Ju-
ly/August 1992): 30-31. 
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5 
ties may hate. “Free speech is not simply an aspect of the 
educational enterprise to be weighed against other desirable 
ends. It is the very precondition of the academic enterprise 
itself.”10  
The current rendition of American campus speech con-
cerns is one marked by what critics call a “hypersensitivity” 
among college students and the “return of political correctness” 
policing speech.11 According to Lukianoff and Haidt in “The 
Coddling of the American Mind”:  
 
A movement is arising, undirected and driven largely 
by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, 
and subjects that might cause discomfort or give of-
fense…This new climate is slowly being institutional-
ized, and is affecting what can be said in the class-
room, even as a basis for discussion.12  
 
Lukianoff and Haidt backed this claim with evidence of 
already widely circulated contemporary race and diversity 
scandals and student demands for safe spaces in these heated 
exchanges. This narrative took for granted the significant social 
frictions created by Black Lives Matter protests against police 
brutality and mass incarceration, the worry about Hispanic 
immigration, and the fear of Islamic extremism. Still, signifi-
cant buzzwords of “safe space” and “trigger warning” propelled 
fear that anybody might declare their narrow viewpoint as 
“safe” and themselves “triggered” by any viewpoints in tension 
with their own, and media coverage could easily find signifi-
cant and worrisome examples of both.  
                                                
10 Ibid., 31. 
11 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, "The Coddling of the Ameri-
can Mind.," The Atlantic, September 2015. Peter Beinart, "Political 
Correctness Is Back," The Atlantic, October 2014. 
12 Lukianoff and Haidt, "The Coddling of the American Mind.” 
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Both terms originated before the current culture solidi-
fied their usage to refer almost exclusively to speech. Accord-
ing to Catherine Fox, safe spaces first appeared on college 
campuses in the early 1990s as physical places for LGBTQ+ 
students to be welcomed.13 The Gay, Lesbian, and Straight 
Education Network (GLSEN) spearheaded this effort through 
its safe space training kit and ally network programs, which the 
group still continues today. The term “trigger warning” has a 
more ambiguous origin, though it appears to have first emerged 
as a concept relating to treatment for PTSD. The term later 
gained prevalence in self-help and feminist forums on the 
Internet, “where they allowed readers who had suffered from 
traumatic events like sexual assault to avoid graphic content 
that might trigger flashbacks or panic attacks.”14 The social 
significance of both terms had, however, shifted from their 
original meanings when Lukianoff and Haidt documented cases 
of students exempting themselves from texts, videos, or 
experiences they found offensive or even just causing strong 
emotional responses in classroom settings.15 Exact definitions 
of both terms remain obscure despite their widespread usage in 
contemporary culture. The generally polarized understanding of 
these terms, and their perceived dangers or necessities as 
policies, is possible because the terms are poorly defined 
among American news-consuming publics.  
Corporatization of education has also led to a shift in 
focus, onto students’ emotional well-being and built environ-
ments that are “conducive” to learning, whatever that means. At 
the same time, social demands make the expected outcomes of 
collegiate experience more severe and anxiety producing. In 
2015 the number one mental health diagnosis among American 
                                                
13 Catherine Fox, "From Transaction to Transformation: 
(En)Countering White Heteronormativity in "Safe Spaces" College 
English 69, no. 5 (May 2007): 498. 
14 Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015. 
15 Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015. 
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college students officially changed from depression to anxie-
ty.16 According to The Wall Street Journal, in 2016 “nation-
wide, 17 percent of college students were diagnosed with or 
treated for anxiety problems during the past year, and 13.9 
percent were diagnosed with or treated for depression, accord-
ing to a spring 2016 survey of 95,761 students by the American 
College Health Association.”17 The percentage of college 
students with anxiety rose over five percent since 2011.18 The 
conversations surrounding speech on campuses inevitably are 
attuned to students’ mental health, though institutions disagree 
on what policies best support their students, and by extension 
their public images.  
Recent policy changes also accompany the current pre-
occupation with speech in American higher education, reflect-
ing the corporatization and anxiety. The federal Departments of 
Justice and Education edited language in a statute defining 
sexual harassment to broaden the punishable offense from 
speech that is “objectively offensive” to speech that is “unwel-
come” in 2013.19 According to Lukianoff and Haidt, this 
legislative shift in sexual harassment law permeates all anti-
discrimination statutes. “Everyone is supposed to rely upon his 
or her subjective feelings to decide whether a comment by a 
professor or a fellow student is unwelcome, and therefore 
grounds for a harassment claim. Emotional reasoning is now 
accepted as evidence.”20  
While there are multiple sides to the safe space and 
campus speech discussions, and these debates have an impact 
                                                
16 Abby Jackson, "Depression Is No Longer the No. 1 Mental-health 
Concern among College Students." Business Insider, June 2, 2015. 
17 Andrea Peterson, "Students Flood College Mental-Health Centers," 
The Wall Street Journal October 10, 2016. 
18 Peterson, 2016 
19 Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015 
20 Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015 
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on university policy and even federal legislation, the majority 
of conversation surrounding this issue within the public sphere 
has been unsophisticated and polarized by political affiliations. 
Opponents of the proliferation of safe spaces and trigger 
warnings claim that their prevalence on college campuses 
prevent students from growing intellectually because they 
prevent students from encountering ideas that make them 
uncomfortable. Proponents of the creation of safe spaces and 
the use of trigger warnings see them as methods that actually 
allow for a more diverse and sincere exchange of ideas within 
classrooms because they respect students’ multiple back-
grounds. Responding to The New York Times’ August 2016 
article on the University of Chicago acceptance letter, three 
recent alums of peer Ivy League institutions claim that trigger 
warnings are a necessity on campuses and that Dean Ellison 
fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of trigger warn-
ings.21 An article by The Washington Post, published in May of 
2016, asks local college students to discuss “the new language 
of protest” by explaining what the cultural buzzwords mean to 
them as individuals. When asked how they respond to the 
sentiment that millennials are coddled one student retorted: “I 
don’t think that respecting people’s existence is coddling, to be 
very frank.” 22 
Clearly the contemporary controversy over campus 
speech and speech regulation is not novel. The University of 
Chicago class of 2020 acceptance letter is not particularly novel 
either. The letter is not unique in substance when compared to 
other texts in the current public debate about campus speech 
policy, “politically correct culture,” or student well-being and 
activism. When analyzing the content, the text simply con-
demns trigger warnings and safe spaces. Official statements 
                                                
21 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-
on-campus.html?_r=0 (accessed November 21, 2016) 
22 Teddy Amenabar, "The New Language of Protest." Washington 
Post May 19, 2016. 
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from other institutions of higher education have been just as 
firm in their approval of these policies. Rather, the University 
of Chicago letter is unique in stylistic structure and in its 
appeals of authority. The acceptance letter format represents an 
unprecedented “insider’s view” of campus speech policy. 
Whereas previous prominent texts have occurred entirely 
outside of the academy or entirely within, this latest text blurs 
the lines between university and public audiences, claiming 
authority in both realms.  
The letter serves first and foremost as a traditional ac-
ceptance letter to incoming students from the echelons of the 
university administration. The intended primary audience (the 
students) first read this text in April or May of 2016, a full two 
to three months before the letter was widely circulated in media 
outlets and showcased to a general news-consuming public. 
Although this text is unique within the current public sphere’s 
body of work addressing campus speech and safe spaces in the 
21st century, it is not novel, historically speaking. The Universi-
ty of Chicago letter is the latest text in over 50 years of discus-
sion concerning free speech and speech regulation in American 
colleges. This text’s importance lies more in how it condemns 
safe spaces and trigger warnings, more so than the act of 
condemnation. 
 
Not Your Average Acceptance Letter: 
The Rhetorical Situation of the Text 
 
In addition to the cultural situation, the University of 
Chicago acceptance letter resides in a rhetorical situation where 
constraints of genre, audience, and exigence apply to the text. 
Various components of the rhetorical situation indicate that the 
University of Chicago letter differs from the broader body of 
work in the public sphere surrounding the discussion of safe 
spaces and speech on college campuses. 
As far as timing goes, Dean Ellison, the speaker in the 
letter and presumed author, is a newcomer to the University of 
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Chicago administration. Dean Ellison joined the university’s 
administration in July of 2014, just before the start of a new 
academic year.23 His previous work was at Harvard University 
where he was an Associate Dean and a professor of near eastern 
languages and cultures.24 Although the letter is not his first act 
as dean of the college, it is the first to make headlines outside of 
the University of Chicago and broader higher education circles. 
The letter might also be Dean Ellison’s first letter to incoming 
students since his arrival at the college. 
There are structural constraints to the text. As an ac-
ceptance letter, Dean Ellison’s message must be formal (mailed 
in an era of email efficiency), short, and plain-styled. However, 
other constraints guide the structure of the letter as well. The 
language is clear in outlining the University of Chicago’s goals 
and firm in disapproving of safe spaces and trigger warnings 
because the text is intended for more than one audience. The US 
News & World Report Higher Education section ranked the 
University of Chicago as the third best university in the nation 
for the 2017 edition of their annual report.25 Additionally, 
according to the university’s student newspaper, The Chicago 
Maroon, the undergraduate college accepted its lowest percent-
age of applicants for the 2020 class (out of the largest applica-
tion pool) in its history. The college only admitted 7.9 percent 
of 31,411 students who had applied.26 The University of 
Chicago’s preeminence means these genre norms will be 
especially scrutinized by undecided students and a press eager 
to spotlight nascent trends from university leaders. Dean 
                                                
23Alice Xiao, "Dean Ellison Holds Fireside Chat." The Chicago 
Maroon January 30, 2015.      
24 Ibid. 
25 US News & World Report “Best National Universities”: 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
colleges/rankings/national-universities (accessed December, 3 2016). 
26 Payton Alie, “University Admits Record Low 7.9 Percent to Class 
of 2020.” The Chicago Maroon May 31, 2016. 
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Ellison probably understood this when the letters were signed 
and mailed. While incoming students were intended recipients, 
the letter was probably penned with the intent of one day 
circulating broadly in a news cycle. 
The two audiences for Dean Ellison’s text are both me-
diated and a disparate collection of individuals rather than a 
unified group reading the text together; however, the audiences 
differ in every other respect. The primary audience for the text 
was the group of graduating high school students who received 
the acceptance letter. This collection of individuals received 
their letters in the spring of 2016 and the text appears to serve 
its genre’s purpose as an acceptance letter welcoming students 
to the university. The second audience is the collection of 
administrators and faculty at peer institutions who received the 
text through digital copies that were flanked with news com-
mentary in late August of 2016. The letter distinguishes the 
University of Chicago from peers that either do not have a firm 
stance on campus speech and safe spaces or have a stance in the 
opposite direction. For example, the dean of Yale’s undergrad-
uate college expressed the college’s commitment to safe spaces 
in a December 2015 Q&A style interview with TIME maga-
zine:  
 
Students calling for a safe space are not saying they 
want their classroom to be a safe space. They know the 
class is going to be a place to push and be pushed, 
where unusual or different ideas are going to be put 
out there and they have to wrestle with them.27  
 
                                                
27 Tessa Berenson and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “Exclusive: Yale’s 
Dean Defends ‘Safe Spaces’ Amid Campus Protests.” Time, Decem-
ber 9, 2015. 
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The interview followed a widely circulated scandal about 
cultural appropriation and policing self-expression surrounding 
an email about Halloween costumes at Yale.28  
The first audience for the University of Chicago text 
appears to be a non-rhetorical one. Accepted students, especial-
ly since they are not a unified audience beyond the common 
thread of their age and academic achievement, cannot respond 
effectively to the text or the exigence behind it. They can accept 
the policy of their new academic home or they can reject the 
policy either by refusing to attend the institution or challenge it 
once arriving to campus in the fall. The second audience is 
rhetorical, although it is not addressed directly by the speaker in 
the text. Peer institutions can respond to the text: they can 
affirm or condemn the University of Chicago’s action and they 
can change their own policies, given enough time.  
Why would there be a secondary rhetorical audience 
for this text? The University of Chicago has been lauded as a 
model for free expression and speech policy in higher education 
in the United States. Shortly after the text of the letter was 
widely spread among media outlets in August of 2016, the 
Editorial Board of The Chicago Tribune declared the “U. Of 
Chicago is the University of Common Sense.”29 Earlier, in 
September of 2015, the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education (FIRE), a nonprofit educational foundation and 
advocacy group, announced a partnership with the University 
of Chicago to encourage other American higher education 
institutions to adopt free expression policies modeled off of the 
Chicago institution.30 One goal of circulating this text in 
                                                
28Liam Stack, "Yale’s Halloween Advice Stokes a Racially Charged 
Debate." The New York Times November 8, 2015. 
29 The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, "Why the U. of Chicago Is 
the University of Common Sense."  
Chicagotribune.com August 26, 2016. 
30 "FIRE Launches Campaign in Support of University of Chicago 
Free Speech Statement." FIRE. September 28, 2015. 
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mainstream media, a more visible venue than the institution’s 
obscure academic policy webpage or partnering nonprofits’ 
websites, is to encourage the letter’s secondary, rhetorical 
audience to change their behavior. Lastly, an influential group 
that appears to have been left out of both the rhetorical audi-
ence and the role of speaker for the text is the faculty at the 
University of Chicago. According to a letter from a University 
of Chicago associate professor of history in response to a New 
York Times article about the text, the faculty was not made 
aware of Dean Ellison’s statement before the letter was mailed. 
In fact “the first that members of the University of Chicago 
faculty learned of the letter on speech policy issued by Chica-
go’s dean of students, John Ellison, was from newspapers” in 
August.31 The omission of faculty, from the roles of both 
speaker and audience, is pertinent because of the dominant 
theme of unified community within the University of Chicago 
acceptance letter. 
The final component of the rhetorical situation is the 
strong commitment by the University of Chicago to free 
expression amid the November 2015 uncertainties for free 
speech in higher education, an exigence that goaded multiple 
responses by the university. The University of Chicago’s 
Committee on Freedom of Expression has compiled statements 
pertaining to academic freedom of faculty and students since 
1995 and published them on their website.32 The committee, 
formed in July of 2014 by the president and provost, was tasked 
with creating a vision statement “reflecting the University’s 
commitment to and tolerance of multiple forms of free expres-
                                                
31 Stanley, 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/ 
sunday/free-speech-on-campus.html?_r=0> (accessed November 21, 
2016) 
32 University of Chicago, <https://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/ 
page/statements-and-messages> (accessed November 21, 2016) 
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sion.”33 The committee issued their statement on January 1st of 
2015. A portion of it reads:  
 
Although members of the University community are 
free to criticize and contest the views expressed on 
campus, and to criticize and contest speakers who are 
invited to express their views on campus, they may not 
obstruct or otherwise interfere with the freedom of 
others to express views they reject or even loathe.34  
 
Given the history of free expression and free speech at 
the University of Chicago, the recent acceptance letter appears 
to just build on previous work within the institution. There is 
one important caveat though: the letter from Dean Ellison is the 
first text in this body of internal documents to explicitly 
mention, much less condemn, trigger warnings and intellectual 
safe spaces. Additionally, the letter is directed to a primary 
audience of incoming members of the University of Chicago 
community; all other statements on campus speech compiled by 
the committee are directed to a primary audience of community 
members who have already been assimilated into the University 
of Chicago group. The text clearly responds to the broader 
cultural exigence beyond the University of Chicago by adopting 
the broader culture’s significant language to share the institu-
tion’s message of free expression to new and disparate audienc-
es through the unconventional medium of a college acceptance 
letter. 
                                                
33Robert J. Zimmer and Eric D. Isaacs. "President Robert J. Zimmer 
and Provost Eric D. Isaacs: Letter to Campus." UChicago News. 
September 25, 2014. 
34 Geoffrey Stone, Marianne Bertrand, Angela Olinto, Mark Siegler, 
David Strauss, Kenneth Warren, and Amanda Woodward. Report of 
the Committee on Freedom of Expression. University of Chicago. 
Accessed November 21, 2016.  
https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/FO
ECommitteeReport.pdf (accessed November 21, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amanda Richey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Community Freedom is more important than You:  
Ideographs and Authority within the Text 
 
At first glance the University of Chicago acceptance 
letter does not appear to be a rhetorical text. The language is 
brusque and the style is low and instructional, even bureaucrat-
ic. One could read the text as a crash course in speech policy 
for an incoming member of the university community. Howev-
er, there are subtle persuasive appeals working behind the 
scenes to establish an argument about the validity of the 
University of Chicago’s speech policy. Within the University of 
Chicago acceptance letter there are dominant ideographs that 
present separate juxtapositions of individual liberty and group 
conformity. The ideograph of <freedom> establishes a dichot-
omy between the University of Chicago’s policies and those 
supporting trigger warnings and safe spaces. The secondary 
terms of <trigger warnings> and <safe spaces> also serve as 
ideographs, albeit negative ones. The ideograph of <communi-
ty> juxtaposes current members of the University of Chicago 
community (“we”) with the intended primary audience, the 
high school student to whom the letter is addressed (“you”). 
This final ideograph further guides the structure of the text in 
terms of pronoun usage, direct address, and active versus 
passive verbs. When the University of Chicago text is com-
pared with others within the genre of college acceptance letters, 
elements of choice and agency common to other acceptance 
letters are absent. All of these components converge into a 
subtly persuasive text that prevents the primary and secondary 
audiences from challenging the assumptions about community, 
speech, and speech policies that the text presents.  
The ideographs of <freedom> and <community> are 
widespread throughout the acceptance letter. <Freedom,> as it 
is presented in the text, concerns “academic freedom,”35 
                                                
35 Ellison, 2016, lines 12, 22, and 23 
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16 
freedom of “inquiry and expression,”36 and freedom to “es-
pouse ideas”37 or “exchange” ideas.38 The term is presented 
nine times within the letter and is present in every paragraph 
except the first and last ones. The emphasis on freedom, a 
positive ideograph within American culture, is juxtaposed with 
the discussion of safe spaces and trigger warnings in the third 
paragraph:  
 
our commitment to academic freedom means we do 
not support so-called ‘trigger warnings,’ we do not 
cancel invited speakers because their topics might 
prove controversial, and we do not condone the crea-
tion of intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can 
retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their 
own.39 [italics added] 
 
This is the only time trigger warnings and safe spaces 
are mentioned. Despite their relative absence compared to 
<freedom> these terms are no less powerful as ideographs that 
dominate the text. According to Michael McGee, who first 
theorized ideographic criticism, “an ideograph is always 
understood in its relation to another.”40 Under the dichotomous 
relationship established in the text, the University of Chicago’s 
policy is “good” because it supports “freedom” and the alterna-
tive of trigger warnings and safe spaces are “bad” because they 
do not. However, trigger warnings and intellectual safe spaces 
are not explicitly defined in the text and as such they almost 
function as empty signifiers, taking on whatever meaning a 
                                                
36 Ellison, 2016, lines 6, 7, and 8  
37 Ellison, 2016, line 18 
38 Ellison, 2016, line 16 
39 Ellison, 2016, lines 12 - 15 
40 Michael Calvin McGee, "The “ideograph”: A Link Between 
Rhetoric and Ideology." Quarterly Journal of Speech 66, no. 1 
(February 1980): 14. 
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reader wishes. The only definition the reader receives about 
these concepts is that they allow individuals to “retreat from 
ideas and perspectives at odds with their own.” If this were 
always the case, then why would comparable American 
institutions like Yale support safe spaces and trigger warnings? 
The fact that neither the “bad” trigger warnings or safe spaces 
are explicitly defined, especially because they are more 
ambiguous terms than freedom, presents a troubling dichotomy 
that does not allow for an alternative interpretation of these 
policies where they are not antithetical to the goals of higher 
education.  
<Community,> as it is presented in the text, concerns 
the University of Chicago both as a monolithic group and 
individual “members”41 within the group. The term “our 
community” is presented twice while “members of our commu-
nity” is presented three times. The pronouns “our” and “we” are 
more frequent, appearing in every paragraph of the text except 
the last one. The emphasis on community, both through explicit 
naming of the term and through collective pronouns, is juxta-
posed with the direct address towards the primary audience. 
Throughout the text, “our” and “we” is paired with “you,” the 
teenaged recipient of the acceptance letter. For example:  
 
You will find that we expect members of our communi-
ty to be engaged in rigorous debate, discussion, and 
even disagreement. At times this may challenge you 
and even cause discomfort.42 [italics added] 
 
This example indicates that the “you” is secondary to 
the “we” of the <community>. The “you,” an incoming 
member of the community, is expected to conform to the 
community norms, even (or especially) when they “cause 
                                                
41 Ellison, 2016, lines 7, 8, 10, and 18 
42 Ellison, 2016, lines 9 - 11 
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discomfort.” Whereas the collective pronouns appear in almost 
every paragraph, “you” is noticeably absent from paragraphs 
three through five, which discuss trigger warnings, the goal of 
diversity within the community, and the history of the Universi-
ty of Chicago’s “debate, and even scandal, resulting from our 
commitment to academic freedom.”43 The non-direct address 
within this section is understandable, since these paragraphs 
outline community norms. However, this central section is also 
the only section of the entire text that uses verbs of stasis rather 
than active verbs. The fourth paragraph has no human actor. 
The subjects are concepts, not people such as “we” or “you.” 
This paragraph features emotional appeals and actions to 
support community goals that have yet to be fulfilled. “Diversi-
ty...is a fundamental strength of our community,” line 17 reads. 
But who will ensure that the community is in fact diverse in 
“opinion and background?”44 “The members of our community 
must have the freedom to espouse and explore...ideas;” but who 
will work to guarantee that freedom?45 The lack of “you” 
pronouns represents a shift away from directly addressing the 
primary audience. The removal of active verbs in this section of 
the text persuades the reader to enter a type of contract where 
they fill in the blanks left by the text. In order for the “you” to 
join the “we,” the reader must become the actor that ensures the 
community’s goals of diversity and freedom are met, or at the 
very least does not impede the community from ensuring the 
goals are met. The sentences in paragraph four also appeal to 
the reader to act on the virtuous ideographs presented in the 
text. The accepted student should uphold standards of <free-
dom> – by rejecting trigger warnings and safe spaces – to 
support the <community>.    
Compared to other university acceptance letters, the 
University of Chicago text diverges from genre norms in two 
                                                
43 Ellison, 2016, line 23 
44 Ellison, 2016, line 17 
45 Ellison, 2016, line 18-19 
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significant ways. The University of Chicago letter does not 
assume that the primary reader, the graduating high school 
senior, might choose a different college or university to 
continue their education, nor does it include relevant supple-
mentary information like an “Accepted Students Day” date or 
final deposit deadline for enrollment. For example, a 2013 
Washington Post article on American college acceptance letters 
included 10 examples of elite Eastern Seaboard universities’ 
acceptance and denial letters for the class of 2017.46 Half of the 
acceptance letters included language that implied that the 
student’s choice to attend college at the institution they were 
accepted into was not final. An acceptance letter from MIT 
explicitly stated, “You’ll likely have offers of admission from 
many fine schools, but we hope that you’ll choose to enroll at 
MIT.” Additionally, nine of the 10 acceptance letters included 
important dates for students, such as final deposit deadlines and 
days to visit campus with peer accepted students. While these 
10 institutions are hardly representative of the letters sent 
annually by hundreds of universities across the United States, 
they do represent norms for the genre: a conciliation that the 
reader has agency in accepting or rejecting the school and some 
basic guidance in the form of “next steps” to fulfill that agency. 
The absence of an appeal to students to finalize their decision 
further emphasizes the dominance of <community> in the text. 
The language assumes that the student reading the letter is 
already a neophyte member of the University of Chicago and 
that he or she will not reject this community by choosing to 
“continue [their] intellectual journey” somewhere else.47 The 
last line of the University of Chicago letter says it best: “See 
you in September!”48 Additionally, the fact that the University 
                                                
46 Richardson, Linch, and Anderson, March 31, 2013. 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/local/university-acceptance-
and-denial-letters/86/ (accessed December, 3 2016).  
47 Ellison, 2016, line 4 
48 Ellison, 2016, line 27 
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of Chicago letter does not address practical “next steps” for 
students represents a framing device that reveals the text’s 
secondary audience of administrators at peer institutions. There 
is no need to discuss the logistics behind the transition from 
high school to college because the secondary audience does not 
need this information. The practicality of choosing a college 
and the logistical steps that accompany it are eclipsed by the 
prominence of <freedom> and <community> and their implica-
tions for campus speech within the text. The text appears to 
follow the constraints of the college acceptance letter genre 
merely in the length of the letter and in language presented in 
the first and final paragraphs congratulating the recipient for 
acceptance into the University of Chicago community. In this 
way, the expected genre of a college acceptance letter “brack-
ets” the actual text concerning <freedom,> <community,> and 
speech.  
The prevalence of culturally “good” ideographs and the 
juxtapositions between <freedom> and trigger warnings and 
safe spaces as well as between “we the community” and “you 
the incoming student” creates a virtuous authoritarian tone. The 
community within the University of Chicago is upholding the 
important cultural value of freedom by condemning trigger 
warnings and safe spaces, even if incoming members of the 
community want these policies. The work that the reader 
participates in to “fill in the blanks” left by static verbs in 
paragraph four reinforces the authority of the community. 
Further, the lack of agency conceded to the reader in choosing a 
college, arguably a genre norm for college acceptance letters, 
completes this work to assert authority. However, all of these 
components pertain to the primary audience of accepted high 
school students. The same authoritarian tone applies to the 
secondary rhetorical audience of administrators at peer institu-
tions. Without considering the “we” versus “you” juxtaposition 
the authoritarian tone is not as evident, but the prevalence of 
<freedom,> and its juxtaposition with trigger warnings and safe 
spaces, is not contingent on a designated audience. The 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amanda Richey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
emphasis on <freedom,> an ideograph with very positive and 
powerful connotations in American society, and the assertion 
that “one of the University of Chicago’s defining characteristics 
is our commitment to freedom of inquiry and expression” still 
aligns the speaker in the text to a culturally entrenched moral 
superiority and the authority that stems from it.49 This authority 
is conveyed whether the audience is subordinate to the Univer-
sity of Chicago community, as an incoming college student, or 
on the same level of the hierarchy, as a member of a peer 
institution of higher education. The prevalence of ideographs 
and their moral undercurrents, the juxtapositions these ideo-
graphs present as well as the structure of pronoun usage, direct 
address, and active language all establish a text that might 
prevent audience members from questioning the claims the text 
presents about speech and community.   
 
Merging Publics’ Understanding of Campus Speech:  
Why This Letter Matters 
 
It may be too early to tell the effect that the University 
of Chicago acceptance letter had on the intended audiences or 
on the broader debate addressing safe spaces and free speech on 
college campuses. However, media response in the three 
months since the letter was circulated broadly among a general 
American public indicate the wider importance of this text to 
the current cultural moment.  
According to Google Trends, both the terms “trigger 
warnings” and “safe space” saw an increase in popularity on the 
search engine during the week of August 21st to 28th 2016, the 
same week that NPR, The New York Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, and other major news outlets released coverage on the 
University of Chicago acceptance letter.50 “Trigger warning” 
                                                
49 Ellison, 2016, lines 5-6  
50 Google Trends. Accessed November 21, 2016. 
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saw peak popularity during this week for the first time in a 
decade, whereas the popularity for “safe space” was at 53 
percent popularity, with peak popularity in the fall of 2015, 
according to the Google Trends website on November 21st. 
When comparing the two cultural buzzwords with the term 
“University of Chicago letter,” there was a correlation in 
increases in popularity in August of 2016 (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Popularity of terms “trigger warning” (in blue) “university of 
chicago letter” (in red), and “safe space” (in yellow) from November 27, 
2011 to November 21, 2016. Accessed November 21, 2016. 
 
The University of Chicago letter gained this promi-
nence by addressing separate audiences (higher education 
institution communities and general news-reading publics) 
through the novel medium of a college acceptance letter and by 
adopting significant, though relatively abstract, vocabulary. The 
letter went one step beyond previous literature concerning safe 
spaces and speech regulation to offer unique perspectives to 
each audience. Laypeople consuming the text through the news 
cycle gained an “insider’s view” of the college admissions 
process while peer institutions and incoming student members 
of the University of Chicago community saw freedom of 
expression and campus speech policy defined against intellec-
tual safe spaces and trigger warnings. This dual address to 
distinct audiences merged the segmented readers into one 
public unified by the act of reading the letter. Apart from this 
common ground, however, the readers diverged on their 
opinions concerning the purpose behind the letter and the 
University of Chicago’s speech policy itself.  
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Apart from the merging of audiences into a unified 
public, the text’s structure also presents a persuasive appeal to 
prevent the reader from questioning the philosophical assump-
tions made in the text. The adoption of culturally significant 
ideographs and buzzwords beyond the institution’s internal 
speech policy vocabulary allowed the text to gain prominence 
in the news cycle. When paired with the virtuous authoritarian 
tone of the letter, it further entrenches the broader cultural 
narrative of safe spaces as a dangerous and pervasive threat to 
higher education that must be stopped. The letter does not allow 
for any questioning of what is meant by “intellectual safe 
space” or why this term is in opposition to <freedom>. When 
this persuasive appeal is pushed beyond an insular university 
community into a politically polarized cultural situation, it 
further justifies the staunch opinions on either side of the issue, 
without fostering informed or sophisticated discussion. By 
failing to define common, relatively abstract terms in the text, 
advocates of safe spaces and trigger warnings can assert that 
Dean Ellison doesn’t know what he’s talking about in the 
acceptance letter. By creating a dichotomy between these 
speech policies and the unquestionable virtue of freedom, 
opponents of safe spaces and trigger warnings can assert a 
moral high ground, using the letter to justify their claims. Either 
way, the text creates a wall of authority that buttresses against 
engaging the “other side;” it functions to merely reinforce 
beliefs about the necessity or danger of certain speech policies. 
While it remains to be seen whether the University of Chicago 
acceptance letter to the Class of 2020 will have this effect – or 
any lasting effect, for that matter – on the broader contempo-
rary fascination with speech and its regulation on college 
campuses, the unique structure of the text, its subtle persuasive 
appeals, and its emergence in a time marked by social polariza-
tion suggest that this is not the last time we will see the merging 
of the academy and the broader media market. The implications 
of this merge, particularly on complex topics like academic 
freedom, speech, and identity, are pertinent. Letters like this 
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one seem to not only frame accepted students as fated custom-
ers, but also seek out mediated audiences that will polarize the 
discourse of college around unnecessary, empty buzzwords 
linked to central political ideographs of freedom and speech. 
However, there are much better spaces to discuss the words and 
symbols that will “never hurt us” than a college acceptance 
letter. 
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WILLFUL IGNORANCE, EMBODIMENT, 
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF SYMPATHY: 
J.M. COETZEE ON ANIMAL CRUELTY 
THROUGH FICTIONAL INTERLOCUTORS 
 
Erin Mellor 
 
 
Many animal rights activists agree that pain is univer-
sally felt, spanning human-animal barriers to encompass all 
living, or embodied, things. Elizabeth Costello, the aging 
female novelist central to J. M. Coetzee’s novella, utilizes a 
series of metaphors in her lecture The Philosophers and the 
Animals to compare animal suffering to human suffering. 
Coetzee uses the character of Costello as a lens for addressing 
the ethical boundaries of horror and what it means to not only 
be cognizant of immense suffering, but to willfully ignore 
“places of death” as an entire community.1 I will explore the 
ethical boundary between human suffering and animal cruelty 
as seen in the metaphors presented by Coetzee’s Costello in her 
first lecture, The Philosophers and the Animals: the comparison 
of the meat industry to the Third Reich, and mass animal 
slaughter to the Nazi death camps. It is too reductionist to claim 
that Costello is a stand-in for Coetzee, yet they share similar 
life experiences and a pessimistic outlook on the ability of 
society to progress. The latter distances himself from his own 
beliefs by utilizing fictional interlocutors, allowing for an 
expansive examination of the multiplicities inherent in hege-
                                                
1 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 35.  
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monic evaluations of suffering, the nonpower inherent in 
power.2 
Is it ethical, from a philosophical standpoint as well as 
a literary one, to draw upon the horrors of the Holocaust in a 
metaphor referencing the mass slaughter of animals? Are there 
specific moments in history that are too appalling and deeply 
personal to ever appropriately use as a point of comparison in a 
contemporary argument? Coetzee clearly takes the issue of 
human mistreatment of animals seriously, as his protagonist’s 
chosen metaphorics equate human cruelty towards animals with 
the calculated murder of millions of Jews in the Holocaust. 
Coetzee presented his pseudo-lecture, the novella itself, at the 
1997-98 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, both reveal-
ing and veiling his opinions on the way human beings treat 
animals in our capitalistic society.3 Through Costello’s chosen 
metaphors, we see Coetzee’s own moral opprobrium with the 
meat industry, as well as his understanding of how audiences, 
representative of society in microcosm, perceive and respond to 
his arguments. The comparison between the victims of fascism 
and factory farms is not inherently objectionable when in the 
form of a literary device, solely because figurative devices in 
literature do not carry a burden of proof. They are meant to 
illustrate an idea, not substantiate it. It is too simple to claim 
that the comparison lessens the tragedy of the Holocaust and 
the pain felt; in fact, this line of reasoning precludes the 
                                                
2 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 396. Derrida explores 
multiple questions with the reader on the ability of animals to feel 
suffering. He asks, “What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of this 
inability? What is this nonpower at the heart of power? What is its 
quality of modality? How should one account for it? What right 
should be accorded it? To what extent does it concern us? Being able 
to suffer is no longer a power, it is a possibility without power, a 
possibility of the impossible.” I think it is productive to engage the 
possibility that Coetzee used his lecture to respond to Derrida’s ideas.   
3 Amy Gutmann, introduction to The Lives of Animals, ed. J. M. 
Coetzee (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3.  
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acknowledgment that animals have souls and can thus suffer. 
However, what metrics exist for measuring the ethical applica-
bility of figurative language, the level of sensitivity surrounding 
historically charged words and phrases? In what ways does 
Coetzee himself escape culpability because he presents the 
comparison through the words of a fictional lecturer?  
Costello’s metaphor in her lecture The Philosophers 
and Animals, while controversial, aptly illuminates the tragedy 
of the meat industry. It helps underline the gravity of how 
humans oppress nonhuman animals and escape culpability. 
However, one reason Costello’s metaphor is so shocking—and 
can be argued insensitive—is because she does not assure her 
audience of the ways in which her comparison could be 
perceived as offensive. She fails to address the ways in which 
history integrates itself into present discussions, so that the 
Holocaust is not less important because it happened in the past 
and cannot be reconciled (as the meat industry of the present 
day can.) Her fatal flaw is in replacing an equal sign with a 
greater than sign, claiming that the meat industry is worse than 
what the Third Reich unrolled. She states that “an enterprise of 
degradation, cruelty, and killing” exists that “rivals anything 
that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it” (21).4  
However, Costello does not discomfit her audience be-
cause this correlation is ungrounded, or because she does not 
qualify her subject matter enough. Rather, Costello’s lecture 
makes her audience uncomfortable because it “breaks with the 
expected academic norms” thus provoking “awkward emotional 
exchanges” as pointed out by Frances Mascia-Lees, an Ameri-
can anthropologist.5 We can see this in the decisive letter 
Abraham Stern, a professor at Appleton College, sends to 
Costello, calling her out for trading “on the horrors of the 
camps in a cheap way” and insulting “the memory of the dead” 
                                                
4 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 21.  
5 Frances E. Mascia-Lees and Patricia Sharpe, “Introduction to 
Cruelty, Suffering, Imagination: The Lessons of J. M. Coetzee” 
American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 84.  
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(50).6 Coetzee presents us with a protagonist who addresses her 
audience directly, claiming no pretense. She deviates from 
polite conversation with an apology that sounds much more like 
an indictment, asking her audience to “pardon the tastelessness 
of the following” before theorizing about the body fat of 
Treblinka’s victims being used as in ingredient in soap (21-
22).7 We are so shocked by her words that we cannot process 
the greater meaning behind them. The metaphor falls flat.  
From a historical point of view, Costello’s metaphor is 
appropriate. According to Boria Sax, the term “Holocaust” 
originally denoted “a Hebrew sacrifice in which the entire 
animal was given to Yahweh to be consumed with fire” (156).8 
In a weird twist, a form of animal exploitation—animal killed 
for spiritual offering—became the chosen metaphor for the 
murder of millions of Jews by the Nazi Germans. The very term 
“Holocaust” alludes to and denotes animal suffering. And if 
literature seeks to illuminate the human experience and the 
ways in which we move through the world, metaphors help 
elucidate what lies within us. David Sztybel, a philosopher 
specializing in animal ethics, wrote an intriguing essay defend-
ing the metaphor of the Holocaust victims to animals in the 
meat industry. He claims that in asking if we dare point out “the 
chilling similarities between how Jews were treated in the 
Holocaust and how animals are treated in the present day” we 
are really asking if human beings are of “superior moral 
significance relative to nonhuman animals” (98).9 Sztybel’s 
selected similarities stand the test: displacement, separation 
from family, voicelessness, unfathomable amount of deaths, 
namelessness, transported in confined places, and a disowning 
of responsibility by the perpetrators, coupled with conditioned 
                                                
6 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 50. 
7 Ibid., 21-22.  
8 Boria Sax, Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the 
Holocaust (New York: Continuum, 2000), 156.  
9 David Sztybel, “Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the 
Holocaust?” Ethics and the Environment 11 (2006): 98.  
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indifference. This removes the systems of power that we see in 
differentiating “man” from “animal” and replaces both with the 
identifier of sufferer. And yet, instead of enumerating the 
horrors of the meat industry and its procedures, Costello 
discusses facts about the Holocaust and leaves it up to those in 
attendance to draw the parallels, the very people she earlier 
notes whom can only “comprehend the deaths of others” by 
thinking of the victims “one at a time” (19).10   
Audience members at The Philosophers and the Ani-
mals lecture view Elizabeth Costello as removed from society, 
entertaining if not completely delusional. She does not really 
have much power in effecting change or elevating her audience 
to the state of heightened moral awareness that she herself 
inhabits because her uncomfortable pauses and alarming 
analogies alienate her. Thus, we see a correlation between an 
escalated sensitivity to animal abuse and a fall in social status, 
as Costello moves from expert to outcast, celebrated to criti-
cized, influential to delusional. An element of attenuated 
agency exists within each listener, as they can visually see what 
happens to someone who has such an extreme aversion to the 
meat industry and its practices—you will be seen as strange, 
incoherent, and disorganized. 
This begs the question, why did Coetzee make Costello 
his protagonist? Why give her such a weak voice, a voice that 
lacks gravitas and conviction in making her case against animal 
cruelty? An art critic, Ward Jones, argues that the main lesson 
of The Lives of Animals is how “the portrait that we have of an 
ethical informant” can contribute to the way we evaluate the 
argument at hand (209).11 Costello begins her lecture asking her 
audience to “concede” to her “the rhetorical power to evoke 
these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force” 
which is ironic as she is relatively powerless in evoking a good 
                                                
10 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19.  
11 Ward E. Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral 
Philosopher,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2011): 
209.  
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response (19).12 Why does Coetzee choose a voice that is 
elderly, scattered, and alarmist as the instrument for perpetuat-
ing his ideas? I agree with the literature arguing that “fictional 
narratives can possess ethical authority” but think that the 
choice to make that ethical authority questionable is an ingen-
ious ploy by Coetzee (209).13 Costello’s weak authority and 
flaws as a public speaker reflect the thoughts of an author who 
knows that his position is trivialized in and disruptive to 
popular thought. This shows that Coetzee does not believe 
society can recognize the severity or extent of this kind of mass 
cruelty and change. He concedes to the moral apathy of humans 
and the limited potential for an expansion of human empathy 
for animals, as they are non-human and thus other. Coetzee 
identifies with the futility of serving as a moral persuader, and 
turns to the use of interlocutors to stir the pot for him, to present 
ideas that resonate with both the pedagogue and the participant.  
Coetzee develops these interlocutors to start a conver-
sation on the concept of cruelty. If pain is a universal sensation 
felt, then cruelty inflicted on an animal is just as horrific as 
cruelty inflicted on a human. What does it mean to be a conduit 
capable of inflicting suffering and cruelty on other living 
creatures? It is hard to answer this question because a “uniform 
or ubiquitous cross-cultural concept of ‘cruelty’ towards 
animals” does not exist (129).14 While global watchdogs for 
human rights operate around commonly accepted ideals of 
morality and justice, international organizations protecting the 
rights of animals find it much harder to make universal claims, 
as there is no cross-cultural acceptance of where animals stand 
                                                
12Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19. 
13Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral Philoso-
pher,” 209. 
14Agustin Fuentes, “The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of 
Humans: A View From Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. 
Coetzee’s ‘Elizabeth Costello’” American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 
129.  
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in relation to humans. But what if we are not in the position of 
pain-inflictor, but in the position of pain-witness?  
Costello makes it clear that the Germans who “lived in 
the countryside” around the Nazi death camps “could not afford 
to know” what took place within the camps (19).15 They 
rejected a reality that was too painful to accept. But she does 
not disparage these people as uniquely immoral—rather, their 
actions were reflective of the average German citizen. Camps 
covered the Reich like sores. Just as the majority of Americans 
live in close proximity to places where meat is produced, 
distributed, or sold, Costello argues “few Germans lived more 
than a few kilometers from a camp of some kind” (20).16 
Evidence of immense cruelty and horror was in the air, swirled 
across some pathway of the conscious, even if it could not be 
fully explicated or clearly labeled. Costello claims that humans 
utilize ignorance as a survival mechanism when faced with 
mass-scale suffering. The actions of the Germans behind the 
camp were so appalling that the average German citizen needed 
to disassociate in order to keep his or her sanity. They chose to 
be willfully ignorant.  
Costello’s lecture is ultimately an appeal to examine 
how human beings sympathize, or refuse to sympathize, with 
those they do not identify with, those that remain in the 
ambiguous category of other—or, more aptly—nonhuman. 
Costello associates willful ignorance with a purposeful refusal 
to acknowledge embodied-beings. She claims that merely being 
alive “is to be a living soul” (33).17 Thus, animals, a domain 
encompassing human beings, all possess embodied souls. 
Through her dialogue on embodiment, we see glimpses of 
Coetzee’s philosophy emerging. He urges the reader to 
acknowledge that the majority of individuals fail to recognize 
the capacity of all embodied things to suffer, just as the 
fictional lecture attendees fail to recognize the magnitude of 
                                                
15Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19. 
16 Ibid., 20.  
17 Ibid., 33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 
 
 
36 
Costello’s argument. Jacques Derrida explores the idea of an 
animal’s ability to suffer. If humans are the agents in power, 
and they define what is nonhuman, than asking the question, 
“Can animals suffer?” is analogous to asking if animals can not 
be able to suffer. He further probes, to what extent should we 
be concerned with the ability of an animal to suffer, if “being 
able to suffer is no longer a power” but a “possibility without 
power” (396).18 Would not animals gain superiority over man if 
they were unable to suffer? And yet, this cannot be true. And it 
is problematic if individuals recognize this capacity to suffer. If 
an individual recognizes the capacity of all embodied things—
creatures with a heart and soul—to suffer, then cruelty gains 
more weight. Animal cruelty moves from a necessary evil, 
something you grimace at but continue to ignore, to a grave 
injustice that requires action. Suddenly, the confinement of 
animals stuffed into boxes, pens, coops, and cages becomes as 
glaringly offensive as the confinement of humans in cattle cars.  
I want to extend Coetzee’s thinking and propose that 
Costello misses something crucial by making this a binary 
response—sympathizing or refusing to sympathize. A variety of 
obstacles to human sympathy for suffering exist: not knowing, 
willfully not knowing (as Costello highlights), compassion 
fatigue (the inability to invest the tremendous emotional energy 
that sympathy requires for every injustice), and apathy from the 
feeling of impotence in the face of overwhelming injustice or 
cruelty. Therefore, a lack of sympathy is not always a psycho-
logical defense on behalf of the person witnessing suffering. I 
believe people consciously or unconsciously place their 
psychological suffering on one scale with the ethical behavior 
they wish they could exhibit on the other scale. The scale tips 
towards the heavier desire. By ignoring all of these nuances, 
Costello simplifies the problem of animal cruelty to a point that 
can be easily dismissed by her audience. They perceive her 
points as both radical and irrelevant. This failure on Costello’s 
part makes me question Coetzee’s viewpoint, as he created 
                                                
18Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” 396. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erin Mellor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
Costello’s failure. Perhaps if we can recognize the earnestness 
in which Costello believes her moral knowledge to be true, we 
can also empathize with the frustration of a fruitless mission 
and the inability to will a group to action. And yet, identifying 
with Costello proves exceedingly challenging.   
Costello’s Holocaust metaphor, if it is to be viewed as a 
vehicle for illuminating commonalities, serves its purpose by 
highlighting a lack of sympathy for living beings deemed 
“nonhuman.” Psychologists studying anthropomorphism 
elucidate this idea of nonhuman versus human by putting 
humanness on a continuum. They claim that through anthropo-
morphism “individuals can attribute humanlike capacities to 
nonhuman agents” and through dehumanization they can also 
“fail to attribute these same capacities to other people” (228).19 
While the former mode leads to more moral concern for the 
subject, the latter incites moral detachment. This process makes 
it easier to excuse immoral actions. Costello’s lecture discom-
fits her audience not just because it centers on an analogy to the 
Holocaust, but because it suggests that human cruelty towards 
other humans is no worse than human cruelty towards animals. 
It is easy for us to see “animality in humans,” as most people 
regard Nazi leaders in the Holocaust as morally repugnant and 
thus bestial, but it is harder for us to see the “humanity in 
animals” when this means an integral part of our everyday 
lives—eating meat—is rooted in the suffering of fellow 
creatures (130).20  
 Towards the end of her lecture, Costello returns to the 
death camps to discuss the true horror of the Holocaust—the 
inability of the German perpetrators to “think themselves into 
                                                
19 A. Waytz, J. Cacioppo, and N. Epley, “Who Sees Human?: The 
Stability and Importance of Individual Differences in Anthropomor-
phism,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5 (2010): 228.  
20 Fuentes, “The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of Humans: 
A View From Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. Coetzee’s 
‘Elizabeth Costello,’” 130. 
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the place of their victims” that rattle away in a cattle-car (34).21 
Just as the majority of Germans “closed their hearts” to the 
faculty of sympathy, so does Costello’s audience fail to imagine 
themselves in the body of Costello (34).22 Her own son, whose 
thoughts Coetzee brings us into, thinks her lecture was a 
“strange talk” both “ill gauged” and “ill argued” (36).23 He 
believes she should not be there. Norma, his wife, wants to 
publicly humiliate Costello by asking a malevolent question. 
Costello calls for sympathy, yet we see Coetzee’s two main 
characters deny her compassion. Her appeal is fruitless.  
Just as the audience fails to sympathize with the speaker, so 
I believe that Coetzee satirizes the proclivity of humans to cling 
to ignorance rather than move to action. Costello claims that 
“there are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves 
as someone else” but the overwhelming majority of people 
“have the capacity but choose not to exercise it” (35).24 Humans 
will choose being accepted over being ostracized, even if the 
choice compromises moral norms. History, as seen through the 
Holocaust analogy, continues to prove that those who challenge 
the status quo face ostracism while the ignorant remain safe in 
their country homes. Nazi rhetoric encouraged people to reject 
identifying with Jews. We are similarly conditioned to be 
entirely indifferent to animal suffering as it has become an 
integral part of our society, and those who reject it are cast out 
as pariahs.  
Coetzee proffers an indictment on Elizabeth Costello to the 
reader as well. She alienates herself from her audience through 
her morally superior attitude, seen in moments when she claims 
that she can think her way “into the existence of a bat or a 
chimpanzee or an oyster” because they “share the substrate of 
life” with her (35).25 She posits herself as a witness to a 
                                                
21 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 34. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 36. 
24 Ibid., 35. 
25 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 35. 
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holocaust who refuses to remain silent, rendering her audience 
members the German people of the countryside who witness 
horror and choose willful ignorance. She claims that “each day 
is a new holocaust” and yet “our moral being [remains] 
untouched” and we do not “feel tainted” (35).26 Costello makes 
each new day a harbinger of horrific tragedy. Each day is a new 
holocaust. And each day, we shield our morality from affront, 
to the point where we are inoculated against the brutality. She 
suggests that her audience members are tainted—an affront to 
each member’s moral code that she herself evades. 
In Costello’s voice and actions, we see Coetzee the au-
thor posing the question: Does individual awareness bring 
about any real change, especially if she or he takes an extreme-
ly isolating stance? There is power in his subtlety of narrative 
authority, and Coetzee’s prose reflects an acute awareness of 
the inherent animal suffering in the meat industry. His vision 
for audience response, both the fictional audience receiving 
Costello and the real audience of readers, is bleak—he packag-
es a story in a lecture in which the majority of characters cannot 
change their mindsets or expand their perspectives. Beyond 
that, the individual is relatively weak in her power to effect 
change, especially because Costello’s main arguments remain 
rooted in a metaphor that links the meat industry to a dark, 
indisputably incomprehensible moment in human history. We 
think we have already been morally aroused after the horrors of 
the Holocaust, and that suffering of that magnitude cannot 
possibly be repeated. But just as incidents of genocide took 
place before World War II with the Armenians of the Ottoman 
Empire, and subsequently persisted throughout the twentieth 
century in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda, so do 
grave injustices against living creatures exist in the present day.  
The lecture ends abruptly: “We can do anything and get 
away with it… there is no punishment” (25).27 But is not the 
calculated cruelty of a few at the top of the meat industry worse 
                                                
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
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than the willful ignorance assumed by the majority of human 
beings towards animal cruelty? Coetzee’s fictional scaffolding 
around the subject of animal cruelty in the meat industry allows 
for an inward turn; which character acts in a way I would? The 
reader is privy to the scene but not participating in it. You are 
not tasked with gauging your reaction because you are not 
acting—you are watching. It is almost as if Coetzee presents 
you with the choice between kindness and cruelty itself, 
knowing you will guiltily choose the latter, but from afar. You 
have the privilege of choosing from a private locale, away from 
the fictional group of people in attendance. He knows you will 
not change your perspective, even if a tinge of guilt leaks into 
your conscious. While we do not hold the knives that slit the 
throats of chickens nor press the buttons that systematically 
asphyxiate cattle, we do not question how our meat reaches our 
plates as perfectly symmetrical patties. When activism presses 
up against alienation, humans usually choose the status quo, if 
for nothing more than self-preservation. We willfully ignore the 
suffering of those whom we cannot identify with, feeling 
morally exempt from a murder we did not commit. For being 
the animals in power, humans are quite powerless in effecting 
change.  
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THE CONCEPT OF ART  
AND INTERACTIVE COMPUTER ART 
 
Anhang Ning 
 
 
In this digital era, computers have become an essential 
component of our lives: we connect with each other via social 
media, get real time news updates via the Internet, and share 
music and ideas in the cloud. In the art world, interactive 
computer art has emerged in response to this unique time 
period. This new art form raises some interesting discussions 
concerning interactivity, audience participation, and the very 
medium of the computer. In the first section of this paper, I will 
lay the groundwork through the aesthetic theories proposed by 
Morris Weitz, George Dickie, and Immanuel Kant. Art is an 
open concept, and, the audience is an important component of 
an artwork. In addition, a good work of art evokes a universal 
sense of delight or wonder, which is subjective in nature.  
In the second section, through two major examples, 
“Crossings” (2009) by Nina Yankowitz and “Boundary 
Functions” (1998) by Scott Snibbe, I argue that interactive 
computer art eliminates the distance between the audience and 
the artwork since it demands audience participation. It outper-
forms traditional art forms in terms of artistic techniques, 
displaying effect, and the incorporation of other disciplines. In 
the end, by connecting the two sections, I argue that because 
the core concepts of interactive computer art (i.e. its artistic 
values, the importance of the audience, and the universal 
delightfulness it evokes) are closely related to larger discus-
sions of art, it fits in the category of art.  
With the rapid development of technology and Internet, 
this era with tremendous amount of information has already 
surrounded us, no matter if we are ready or not. Understanding 
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interactive computer art is an initial step toward making sense 
of this technological era. Although the “interactivity” concept is 
radically new, we ought to treat it with careful analysis instead 
of careless rejection. Given that technology changes rapidly, 
perhaps more radical art forms are approaching us in the near 
future; we might be left behind without a sufficient understand-
ing of the contemporary innovations of interactive computer 
art.  
 
What is Essential for the Concept of Art? 
 
Art, given its adventurous character, is an open concept 
that allows continuous modifications. Furthermore, the audi-
ence plays an essential role for the artwork, and one of the 
many components of a successful artwork is that it generates 
universal subjective judgments.  
Unlike rigid scientific theories, the definition of art is 
subject to change. Numerous efforts have been made at an all-
encompassing definition of art; however, the theorists ignore 
the fallacy behind its logic.1 A good definition is composed of 
both necessary and sufficient conditions, meaning that a theory 
is true if and only if the conditions are true. However, given the 
“very expansive, adventurous character of art,”—or, to put it 
more simply, the examples of what count as art change contin-
ually in unpredictable ways—the definition of art lacks suffi-
cient and necessary conditions; thus it is logically impossible to 
generate a definition of art.2  
All existing definitions of art have limitations, for exam-
ple, formalism and expressionism. Formalists believe that the 
essential property of an artwork is the combination of “plastic 
                                                
1 Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” In Aesthetics and 
the Philosophy of Art  ed. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen  
(Malden: Blackwell, 2004): 13.  
2 Ibid. 13, 16. 
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forms” (i.e. lines, colors, shapes and volumes)3; anything 
without significant forms is repudiated from the category of 
art.4 The inadequacy of formalism is obvious: it leaves out other 
essential properties that constitute an artwork, such as its 
historical context, emotions that it evokes, etc. The expression-
ist theory developed by Leo Tolstoy, is also problematic. 
Emotional expression and feelings, expressionists believe, are 
fundamental properties of art.5 Granted, expressionism is 
applicable to many abstract paintings6, but realistic paintings 
focusing on historical events or portraits do not necessarily 
invoke emotional response. Because these paintings are 
considered as art, the expressionist theory is thus insufficient.7 
Similarly, other theories of art, such as organicist theory, 
intuitionist theory, and voluntarist theory are inadequate in that 
“each purports to be a complete statement about the defining 
features of all works of art and yet each of them leaves out 
something which the others take to be central.”8 Different 
theories resemble myriad facets of a diamond; each is merely 
one reflection of the whole.  
 Given that the existing definitions are inevitably limited, 
the role of the concept of art is to describe similarities and 
connections of all artworks. Attention should be shifted from 
definitive theories to a descriptive account: “aestheticians,” 
Weitz argues, “may lay down similarity conditions but never 
necessary and sufficient ones for correct application of the 
                                                
3 An example of formalism is James McNeil Whistler’s Nocturne in 
Black and Gold: the Falling Rocket (1875), which underscores two 
formal elements: color and form (“Formalism in Modern Art”).  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
6 Wassily Kandinsky’s Composition VI (1913) is an expressionist 
painting. The artist invites his audience to sense the orchestral 
harmony inherent in this work. Other expressionist paintings can be 
found in works created by artists from the Blue Rider and the Bridge.  
7 Ibid., 13, 14. 
8 Ibid., 13. 
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concept.”9 Furthermore, when new circumstances arise in the 
art world, theorists discuss whether or not the concept could be 
broadened. As Weitz writes,  
 
 “Art,” itself, is an open concept.  New conditions (cases) 
have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly 
arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which 
will demand decisions on the part of those interested, 
usually professional critics, as to whether the concept 
should be extended or not.10  
 
For example, John Cage’s famous piece 4’33’’ emerged as a 
radical new form of art. During his performance, Cage sat in 
front of the piano, without playing a single note. To determine 
whether or not this is art, theorists can look at the similarities it 
shares with other musical works: a three-movement composi-
tion performed in a recital. However, different from previous 
works, there was complete silence throughout the performance. 
Many audience members were angry about this because they 
expected to hear sound during a piano performance. Cage 
nevertheless believes that all sounds are equal: “not-sounds” are 
not inferior to sounds.11 This piece aimed to “remind the 
listener that s/he can have a satisfying musical experience only 
by using his/her own ears and listening to the sounds and noises 
of the environment.”12 To decide whether or not this piece is fit 
for the category of art, theorists can look at its relationship with 
other musical works and examining both the audience’s and 
Cage’s views.  
Of a profusion of attributes of art, I believe the two cru-
cial properties are: the audience and the universality of the 
                                                
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Ibid., 15. 
11 Marta Blažanović, "Echtzeitmusik: The social and discursive 
contexts of a contemporary music scene."  (diss., Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, 2012), 27.   
12 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anhang Ning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
work. First, an artwork is seen and apprehended by viewers or 
auditors; thus, the audience plays a prominent part in art. 
George Dickie defines art as “an artifact of a kind created to be 
presented to an artworld public.”13 An artwork is made to be 
shown to members of the artworld. If Dickie were right, the 
artworld public is exclusively those who have enough artistic 
education, such that “the members…know how to fulfill a role 
which requires knowledge and understanding similar in many 
respects to that required of an artist.”14 To qualify as a member, 
the individual must have an artistic background similar to the 
artist’s; the common professions of the artworld public include 
“critic, art teacher, director, curator, (and) conductor.”15 
Although I agree with Dickie that the role of the audience is 
important, I think his position on “artworld public” favors 
elitism. I believe that this group can be broadened.  
Many artworks have been created for mainstream audi-
ences, not excluding those with minimal education on art. For 
example, cooperating with art museums, contemporary artists 
aim to present their works and values to the public. The 
education of these artists’ work to the general public is precise-
ly the reason that contemporary art museums exist. One 
important step involved in museum education is creating an 
explanatory label for artworks. After curators finish writing 
labels, museum educators make sure that the language is 
precise and simple, so that it is accessible to different audienc-
es, including non-native speakers, children, advanced readers, 
etc. In addition, a variety of tours are often organized to ensure 
different groups receive suitable educational experiences, 
ranging from toddler tours, school tours, to adult tours and 
Spanish tours. During the opening of an exhibition, it is not 
uncommon to see the artist delivering a talk to the public in 
                                                
13 George Dickie,  “The New Institutional Theory of Art.” In 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art,  ed. Peter Lamarque and Stein 
Haugom Olsen (Malden: Blackwell, 2004): 53. 
14 Ibid., 51. 
15 Ibid., 51. 
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many museums. From these examples, we discern that artists 
and museums work hard to present the knowledge and back-
ground of the artworks to all sorts of audiences; thus Dickie’s 
account on the artworld public is insufficiently inclusive.  
Artistic masterpieces evoke subjective emotions in the 
mind of each audience member. In his famous theory of 
sublimity, Immanuel Kant emphasizes the aesthetic experience 
in our mind.16 The sublime does not exist in objects; one can 
only find it in the mind.17 As Steve Odin points out, Kant’s 
perspective on aesthetic attitude “shift(s) from a position of 
realism, which understands beauty as something only inherent 
in the object, to an idealist (or, as it were, transcendental 
idealist) position that underscores the contribution of the mind 
in aesthetic experience.”18 In other words, far from analyzing 
external features of an artwork, say, in a painting, its lines, 
shapes, and colors, one assesses a work of art based on one’s 
subjective judgment. As Odin writes, “human consciousness is 
not simply a passive recipient: to some extent it actively 
constitutes an object of beauty through various noetic opera-
tions of the mind.”19 Beauty arouses intellectual engagement. 
“The beautiful,” for Kant, “is that which, apart from concepts, 
is represented as the Object of a UNIVERSAL delight.”20 The 
object evokes “similar delight” from all humans.21 Importantly, 
an aesthetic judgment is subjective; therefore, it is “liberated 
from all constraint by concepts” and it “cannot claim the 
‘objective universal validity’ of a logical judgment.”22 The 
concept of subjective universality may seem ambivalent at first 
                                                
16 Steve Odin, Artistic Detachment in Japan and the West: Psychic 
Distance in Comparative Aesthetics (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2011), 38. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 39. 
22 Ibid. 
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glance; however, it simply means that the beautiful, or an 
exquisite work of art, can cause a similar subjective feeling for 
everyone. From my understanding, what Kant means by 
“similar delight” is not merely the feeling of pleasure—it rather 
lies on a broader spectrum of emotions. Standing in front of a 
masterful painting, for example, diverse people experience 
analogous emotions, such as awe, pleasure, or even melan-
choly. 
 
Interactive Computer Art 
 
Interactive computer art offers a new mode of appre-
hending art. By eliminating the distance from the artwork, the 
installation is more action-oriented. Visitors explore the work 
through generated display. The interaction is of a relaxing kind, 
since previous knowledge on the work is not required. The 
medium of the computer is advantageous because: 1) it creates 
the most precise shapes or the most realistic three dimensional 
models, and 2) it allows modification of the work by altering 
digital codes. In addition, interactive installations usually 
incorporate different art forms as well as knowledge from 
multiple disciplines.    
Before we unpack the theories of interactive computer 
art, let us first consider some examples. Displayed in Greece 
and Poland in 2009, “Crossings”23 is an interactive installation 
that advocates religious toleration. By incorporating sacred 
texts of different religions, such as the Old Testament and the 
Quran, the installation encourages the audience to explore 
connections between the scriptures24 Inside the gallery, the 
floor is a projection of mosaic patterns of various churches, 
cathedrals, and temples around the world.25 As participants hear 
religious texts in different dialects, they are invited, using the 
                                                
23 See Appendix. 
24 Project description, 2009. 
25 Ibid. 
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infrared wand, to drag words from religious texts appeared on 
an interactive wall to an adjacent text wall. The program allows 
participants to save their selection and review them on the 
program’s website.    
Another interactive art installation is Scott Snibbe’s 
“Boundary Functions”26 (1998). “Boundary Functions” 
examines the concept of personal space, over which we do not 
have autonomy because of the interrelation between us and 
other people.27 The artwork requires at least two participants. 
An overhead projector draws lines between people: one line 
between two participants, three lines between three participants. 
More lines will be generated as more participants join, resulting 
in the creation of cellular areas. As people move, the lines 
move as well; however, a participant cannot walk outside of 
his/her cellular area, or his/her “personal space.” The installa-
tion vividly shows the conflicted concepts of personal space 
and society: although there is always a line, a “boundary,” 
between us and other individuals, the space is impossible 
without the presence of other people because, presented in the 
model, the involvement of one person is not sufficient for the 
creation of a “personal space.” The mathematical construction 
Voronoi diagram is also used in astronomy to illustrate the 
relationship between gravity and stars, and, in chemistry to 
represent collections of atoms in crystals.28 
Interactive computer artworks, such as “Crossings” and 
“Boundary Functions,” differ from traditional art forms in that 
the participant generates different displays. Dominic Lopes 
writes, “a work of art is interactive to the degree that the actions 
of its users help generate its display (in prescribed ways).”29 In 
                                                
26 See Appendix. 
27 Scott Snibbe, “Boundary Functions.” Scott Snibbe Website.   
1998, 1 March, 2016. 
 <http://www.snibbe.com/projects/interactive/boundaryfunctions/> 
28 Ibid. 
29Dominic M. Mclver Lopes, A Philosophy of Computer Art (New 
York: Routledge, 2010): 37. 
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“Crossings,” participants help generate display by choosing 
words from the sacred texts, which simultaneously appear on 
the adjacent wall. The displays vary because different partici-
pants create different combinations of words. Furthermore, in 
order to better “interact” with users, interactive computer 
artworks include sensor systems, which records the partici-
pants’ gestures and change them into data that the computer can 
process.30 Then, the data is “translated back into real-world 
phenomena that people can perceive.”31 For example, “Bounda-
ry Functions” includes a sensor which detects people’s move-
ment and then transforms the movement into languages that the 
computer can process. Next the system produces data, which 
are then translated to perceivable phenomena, i.e. lines and 
cellular shapes projected on the floor.  
Interactivity may appear nebulous at first glance.  Be-
cause the concept plays such a pivotal role in understanding the 
nature of interactive computer art, it is thus important to 
understand the meaning of interactivity involved in this art 
form. First, interactivity is different from active appreciation. 
Traditional art forms, such as a painting, may evoke active 
reflections by the viewer, whereas interactive computer art 
allows viewers to generate the display. For instance, the 
Romantic painting Monk by the Sea (1810) by the German 
painter Caspar David Friedrich may elicit emotional effects of 
its viewers, such as loneliness, generating further intellectual 
engagement with the work. Although the piece leads to active 
thinking by the viewer, it is not considered interactive. Lopes 
defines this sort of engagement as “active appreciation,” and he 
writes, “whereas art of all kinds invites active appreciation, 
                                                
30 Linda Candy and Ernest Edmonds, “Interaction in Art and Tech-
nology,”  Crossings: Electronic Journal of Art & Technology 2, no. 1 
(2002): 5, 7. David Z. Saltz, “The Art of Interaction: Interactivity, 
Performativity, and Computers,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 55, no. 2 (1997): 118. 
31Saltz, “The Art of Interaction: Interactivity, Performativity, and 
Computers,” 118. 
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only some art is interactive.”32 Active appreciation does not 
alter the display of the work, which excludes it from the 
concept of interactivity.  
Second, another clarification regarding the concept inter-
activity regards its level. Only works that involve strong 
interactivity are interactive computer art. The sort of interactivi-
ty involved in interactive computer art is different from weak 
interactivity in that strongly interactive computer art do not 
have pre-determined structures. For example, computer games 
are strongly interactive media; the players determine how the 
narrative develops when they make different choices.33 Lopes 
writes, when “the structure itself is shaped in part by the 
interactor’s choices,” the artwork is interactive.34 On the 
contrary, the interaction involved in Michael Joyce’s hypertext 
novel Afternoon is weak. The novel allows the readers to 
explore different versions of the narrative each time by clicking 
on different words.35 The role of the reader resembles that of a 
tourist, without actively participating in the work; therefore, the 
interaction is considered weak.36 Unlike strongly interactive 
media video games, the structure of Afternoon is pre-
determined.  
To participate in interactive art installations, audiences 
are not required to have previous knowledge. Unlike perform-
ers, who have professional knowledge on the work and devote 
efforts practicing the work prior to a performance, the audience 
of the interactive artwork does not necessarily have knowledge 
concerning the work prior to the interaction. For example, prior 
to his performance of Beethoven’s No. 5 Concerto, Lang Lang 
has thoroughly learned and practiced the piece. On the contrary, 
                                                
32 Lopes, A Philosophy of Computer Art, 41-42.  
33 Dominic M. Mclver Lopes, “The Ontology of Interactive Art,”  The 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 35, no. 5 (2001): 68. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Saltz, “The Art of Interaction: Interactivity, Performativity, and 
Computers,” 120. 
36 Ibid., 121. 
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a participant of “Boundary Functions” does not have to know 
about Voronoi diagrams and yet can still participate. The 
computer, functioning as an interpreter, automatically generates 
displays through computational processes when input is 
given.37 The computer allows the user to learn and explore the 
work by generating displays.  
The medium of computer has several advantages over the 
media of traditional art forms.  First, the use of computers 
brings a new light on the possibility of the medium. Paul 
Crowther argues for the advantages of digital imagery, since 
digital art and interactive computer art share the same medium, 
and interactive computer art sometimes uses digital images. 
Digital images simply mean computer graphics, which are non-
interactive artworks displayed on a computer. In digital 
artworks, the computer plays a similar role to the canvas of a 
painting. The computer nevertheless radicalizes the contour and 
mass features of traditional art.38 Crowther explains the 
meaning of contour and mass: 
 
When creating a picture, an artist operates, necessarily, 
along an axis defined by two logical extremes…the 
contours of a three-dimensional object or by assem-
bling and blending marks so as to represent its mass, 
or, of course, by combining elements of both.39    
 
The French painter Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres’ work The 
Virgin Adoring the Host (1852) exemplifies an extreme degree 
of contours, as it has clear and precise outline.40 The British 
painter Frank Auerbach’s piece Portrait of Julia (1960) shows 
mass to an extreme degree—its physicality is so obvious that 
                                                
37 Lopes, A Philosophy of Computer Art, 80. 
38 Paul Crowther, “Ontology and Aesthetics of Digital Art,” The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66, no. 2 (2008): 168. 
39 Ibid., 161. 
40 Ibid., 161, 163. 
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the work looks like “relief modeling.”41 Although it is accord-
ing to the painter’s will on where in the contour-mass axis they 
want to display in the work, and despite the fact that some 
artists are capable of extraordinarily precise outlines and 
realistic physicality, the computer outperforms humans.42 The 
computer extends the capability of what humans can achieve in 
that it allows the creation of images with the maximum mass 
and contour features. Another difference between the computer 
and other media, such as a canvas or a piece of paper, is that the 
computer screen is flatter. Surprisingly, this does not diminish 
the quality of displaying and even enhances the quality of three-
dimensional effect.43  
Using its special language, the unique medium of the 
computer also enables modification of the artwork and the 
collaboration between artists. Similar to the software that 
generates digital image, the program of interactive computer art 
includes computer codes based on mathematic models.44 The 
digital code can be altered through the manipulation of its 
mathematic operations.45 Similar to digital images, the program 
of interactive computer art is not permanent, since it allows 
modifications from either the artist himself or other artists. This 
revolutionary aspect shifts our understanding of the traditional 
art-making process—once the work is done, it remains un-
changed. The computer, in contrast, allows and encourages 
ongoing collaborations and exchanges between artists, disci-
plines, and approaches. 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 163. 
43 Ibid., 164. 
44 Holle Humphries, “A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of 
Computer Art.”  The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37, no.1 (2003): 
22. 
45 Crowther, “Ontology and Aesthetics of Digital Art,” 165. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anhang Ning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
Interactive Computer Art as a Radical New Art Form  
 
Information and technology dominate contemporary so-
ciety in myriad ways: on a daily basis, we use cell phones for 
communication, computers for work, and the Internet for 
knowledge. Interactive computer art emerges organically from 
this environment, and leads naturally to consideration of how 
interactivity fits into the larger category of “art.”  
As Weitz suggests, the development of art resembles an 
ongoing adventure. The nature of the concept of art is open and 
allows modification. As new art forms emerge, theorists decide 
whether or not they share similarities with existing ones. It is 
thus unwise to exclude new art forms, even radical ones, from 
the category of art without thorough consideration. It is true 
that interactive computer art exploits a new medium, the 
computer, but a judicious theorist should not deny its status on 
that basis. Similarities between interactive computer art and 
traditional art forms are obvious; for example, interactive 
installations include visual art, sound, and etc, and they are 
usually shown in a museum. Not only does interactive comput-
er art share similarities with traditional art, as discussed in the 
second section, it even perfects certain aspects of existing art 
forms. Interactive computer art works outperform human artists 
in what they can achieve in the mass-contour axis and create 
more realistic three dimensional effects. Furthermore, comput-
ers make possible combination of different art forms, such that 
sounds, texts, and images could all be present in one setting. 
Given that interactive computer art possesses a plentitude of 
artistic values, it belongs to the open concept of art.  
The core concept of interactive computer art, interactivi-
ty, also aligns with Dickie’s views on the important role of the 
audience. Without an interactor, the work is incomplete. 
However, unlike Dickie’s “artworld” concept that inherently 
inclines to elitism, interactive installations welcome each 
visitor, who often doesn’t have prior knowledge, to engage in 
interaction. In this respect, interactive installations are ap-
proachable to a wide range of people as they require minimal 
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artistic education. Since interactive computer art demands 
audience participation, it highlights the audience, who play an 
indispensable part of an artwork. 
Furthermore, the interaction is advantageous to generat-
ing subjective universality as proposed by Kant. When an 
audience member apprehends a painting, a sculpture, or other 
traditional forms of art, there is always a distance between 
them. Interactive installations eliminate such distance through 
active participation. Whereas people are inclined to find formal 
features of a painting, subjective feelings and emotions are 
created when they interact with interactive works. Therefore, 
instead of a passive mode of appreciation, interactive installa-
tions elicit active engagement. Interactive computer art exem-
plifies the concept of subjective universality.   
What changes would maximize the development of inter-
active computer art? First, to give the artist more flexibility, 
more computer software that “[allows] the artist access to 
deeper levels of the computer’s programming system” should 
be developed.46 Whereas many software programs that target 
“specific tasks such as image manipulation” limit the artist’s 
use of the computer to achieve their goals, programs that 
integrate deep features of computing system allow more control 
and creativity.47 Second, the computer artist could be equipped 
with more technological knowledge of programming. Lacking 
such knowledge, as observed by Linda Candy and Ernest 
Edmonds, the artist usually rely on technology experts, and 
they are less certain about how much power they have during 
the art-making process.48 
Interactive computer art, which involves active audience 
engagement, represents a remarkable moment in the develop-
ment of art. The new art form alters the traditional mode of 
encountering art by allowing the audience to generate the 
                                                
46 Candy and Edmonds, “Interaction in Art and Technology,” 9. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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artistic display itself, and the medium enables great improve-
ment in terms of artistic techniques and audience experience. In 
this digital era, everything changes rapidly—we will undoubt-
edly encounter many radical changes, not only in the art world, 
but in society more broadly. Although we should cherish 
traditions, an open mind is essential in the contemporary world. 
If we always live within our predetermined meanings and 
values, we will soon be overwhelmed by the multitude of 
changes. Therefore, it is crucial to embrace valuable new 
changes such as interactive art in order to function within our 
rapidly developing society.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Nina Yankowitz, Crossings (2009) 
http://www2.media.uoa.gr/~charitos/emobilart/exhibition_gr/img/crosings
_2.jp 
 
Scott Snibbe, “Boundary Functions” (1998) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Ax4pgtHQDg 
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AESTHETIC OBJECTIVISM’S “JOYOUS 
POSSESSION OF THE (NATURAL) WORLD,” 
TOWARDS A RELIGIOUSLY USEFUL  
APPRECIATION OF SUBLIMITY IN  
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Maia Wellborn 
 
 
Kant tells us that two things awe him most: the starry 
skies above and the moral law within. But, we might ask, is 
Kant mistaken in grounding the experience of sublimity in his 
moral philosophy as an “attempt to unify art and ethics?”1 
Appreciating the natural sublime in a way that seeks to under-
stand the experience in an all-encompassing manner seems 
quite sensible in some approaches to environmental aesthetics. 
Understandably, then, scholars such as Allen Carlson and Noël 
Carroll seem to defend versions of aesthetic objectivism such 
that these connections are maintained. However, experiences in 
the natural world that are termed “sublime,” can be better 
understood through a specific kind of religious-aesthetic 
appreciation. In what follows, I argue that the natural sublime 
(sublimity as experienced in the natural world) is an experience 
that is closer to what Merold Westphal might call “religiously 
useful,” in that it inspires the sort of awe and celebration that 
connects us to the divine. Building on a view of the sublime 
which mirrors Emmanuel Levinas’s view of the ethical encoun-
ter with the Other, I contend that the natural sublime frustrates 
                                                
1 Julian Young, “Death and Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and 
Heidegger on the Sublime,” Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of 
philosophy and the social sciences Vol. 48, no. 2 (2005): 136. 
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an aesthetic objectivist approach that requires truth values for 
our judgments of what is beautiful and sublime. I will suggest 
that since such objectivist accounts do not accurately capture 
the phenomenological subjectivity experienced in the natural 
sublime, postmodern religious thought can helpfully supple-
ment the field of environmental aesthetics.  
 I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe what I 
take to be the aesthetic objectivist theories of Carlson and 
Carroll, showing why they are inadequate in describing our 
experience of the natural sublime. Next, I will show how a 
comparison of Levinas’s ethical encounter and the natural 
sublime is relevant to the discussion in environmental aesthetics 
because it grounds the content of this experience. Moreover, it 
does so in a way that is “religiously useful” in ways similar to 
Westphal’s description of the God of postmodern religious 
thought. I conclude that an aesthetic appreciation of the natural 
sublime should not reduce the subjective experience to the 
phenomenal object’s properties and our judgments of it to true 
or false propositions. That problematic approach falsely 
delineates the sublime as merely an object in nature, thus 
erasing the existential essence of such experiences. 
 The debate regarding how we ought to appreciate 
nature is a much-discussed issue in contemporary environmen-
tal aesthetics. Allen Carlson notices the issues that arise in our 
attempts either to treat nature as art objects or reduce nature to 
picturesque landscapes. When we treat nature as an art object 
we take it out of its environmental context and when we reduce 
nature to picturesque landscapes we selectively and inappropri-
ately choose from the whole of nature limited portions of it. As 
Ronald Rees points out, this latter view of reducing nature to 
the picturesque has “confirmed our anthropocentrism by 
suggesting that nature exists to please as well as to serve us. … 
It is an unfortunate lapse which allows us to abuse our local 
environments and venerate the Alps and the Rockies.”2 Finding 
                                                
2 Ronald Rees, “Mountain Scenery,” History Today 25 (1975): 312. 
Quoted in Allen Carlson, “Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural 
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both approaches problematic, Carlson attempts to understand 
nature in terms of its appropriate context, similar to how we 
make aesthetic judgments of works of art. He writes, writes:  
 
If to appropriately aesthetically appreciate art we must 
have knowledge of art forms, classifications of works, 
and artistic traditions, then to appropriately aesthetical-
ly appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the 
different systems and elements within those environ-
ments…Thus, the natural and environmental sciences 
are central to appropriate aesthetic appreciation of na-
ture.3 
 
In the same way in which knowledge of painting in the early 
twentieth century is necessary for appreciating the works of the 
Cubists, some knowledge of flora and fauna are necessary to 
appreciate a natural environment rich in flowers and plants.  
Noël Carroll does not reject Carlson’s account, but of-
fers an alternative view in which he claims that some aesthetic 
judgments are emotional responses to nature, and that these are 
just as valid as judgments based upon an understanding of the 
natural sciences. What validates them is the appropriateness of 
the emotional response to the natural environment a person 
experiences. Carroll understands that a central question 
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature subsists in the 
overarching dichotomy between aesthetic relativism and 
aesthetic objectivism. The aesthetic relativist asserts that the 
aesthetic judgments about nature are absolutely subjective 
because they are entirely relative to those who make them. The 
aesthetic objectivist, alternatively, claims that judgments about 
nature are objectively true or false. In Carlson’s view aesthetic 
                                                                                         
Environment,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical 
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 161. 
3 Ibid., 166. 
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judgments can be true if they are based on correct knowledge of 
the natural environment that one experiences. In Carroll’s 
model, aesthetic judgments are true if the emotional response 
they convey is appropriate to the natural environment one is 
responding to.4 Both Carlson’s and Carroll’s models involve 
judgments that are true or false based on matters of fact 
concerning the aesthetic properties of some natural phenomena. 
They both presuppose aesthetic objectivism when it comes to 
the appreciation of nature. Specifically, they depend upon the 
existence of universal, aesthetic properties inherent in natural 
phenomena, while disagreeing about the location of such 
properties and how to access them. 
 Both Carlson and Carroll have insightful reasons for 
contending that aesthetic objectivism is preferable to aesthetic 
relativism regarding our judgments about the natural world. If it 
were not, it would seem impossible to characterize certain 
phenomena as beautiful, striking, visually appealing, and so on. 
Everything in the natural world would appear to us as a 
“blooming buzzing confusion,”5 as William James writes. In 
order to make sense of the world we make truth claims about 
the aesthetic properties of some perceptual object. In doing this, 
we pragmatically dissolve any epistemic limits to our cognition 
in an effort to communicate what is “appropriate, correct, or 
true.”6 By comparing nature to art, Carlson thinks we achieve 
the method for making qualified judgments about nature. 
Because “the objectivity of aesthetic judgments of art depends 
upon identifying the correct category for the artwork in 
question,”7 by applying the comparable paradigm or standard to 
                                                
4 Noël Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and 
Natural History,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical 
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 177-78. 
5 William James, The Principles of Psychology [1890] (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 462. Quoted by Carlson, 164.  
6 Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature,” 180. 
7 Ibid., 181. 
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natural phenomena we are able to make judgments which are 
either true or false about such phenomena—with the natural 
sciences serving as the standard for such judgments. Likewise, 
Carroll thinks that because we can objectively judge our 
emotional responses to what is experiences in nature as 
appropriate of not, they can give us accurate aesthetic judg-
ments of nature.  
 The aesthetic objectivist views that Carlson and Carroll 
champion are problematic because they assume that objectively 
true judgments about phenomena in the natural environment are 
what we are looking for in our appreciation of it. However, I 
would argue that there are experiences in nature that are awe-
inspiring in such a way that they problematize these types of 
objective judgments. They are grounded in an essentially 
subjective appreciation that is internal to a subject’s unique 
relation to it. These are experiences of the natural sublime 
which in some way exceed our appreciation of nature as 
something beautiful.  
The natural sublime is an experience in the natural 
world that overwhelms us. It might involve a feeling whereby 
the object of our perception throws us back on ourselves so that 
we feel our total insignificance in comparison with to nature. In 
some experiences with the natural world we ride the fine line 
between appreciating the imperial grandeur of a phenomenon 
and the displeasing anxiety that it can arouse in our relation to 
it. Sublimity in nature only makes sense when I attempt to 
make sense of myself in comparison to it. I notice the differ-
ence between what is out there in the world, and what I possess 
as someone who experiences the out-there-ness. Sandra 
Shapshay identifies this difference when she observes that, 
“what is sublime for Kant is not something in the world—some 
portion of the ‘real’ that we directly experience—but a feeling 
we have that is occasioned by certain sensory experiences.”8 In 
                                                
8 Sandra Shapshay, “Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the 
Neglect of the Sublime.” British Journal of Aesthetics 52, no.2 
(2013). 
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all of our attempts to describe the sublime we run into an 
epistemic limit that allows us to communicate such experiences 
only by appealing to subjective sentiments—overwhelming, 
stunning, heart-palpitating. How should we approach making 
judgments of an experience that necessarily involves a subject 
who is at stake in the experience?  
 Emmanuel Levinas’s encounter with what he calls the 
‘Other’ is a compelling place to start in thinking through the 
answer to this question. The natural sublime may occasion a 
kind of experience like the encounter with the Other, which is 
initially the interruption to my “unchecked desire,” and my 
“unbridled self-interest.”9 When I meet someone on the street 
who asks me for spare change, for example, I am suddenly 
interrupted by the Other who presents me with an ethical 
responsibility. Even if I don’t think I should give them spare 
change, I am still confronted with the ethical question: should I 
or not? This ethical responsibility is brought about by an 
asymmetrical relationship with an Other that I cannot fully 
understand. For Levinas, this encounter is pre-ontological 
because it inaugurates selfhood as a response to the infinite 
demand upon us from each and every Other. This encounter 
with the Other is not a spacio-temporal phenomenon because it 
occurs in the realm of the ethical rather than in the domain of 
being. For this reason Levinas answers in the negative to the 
question “is ontology fundamental?” Instead, on his model, the 
ethical encounter itself cannot be totalized in either concept or 
being. This totality for Levinas, as Michael Morgan describes 
it, is “the domain circumscribed, encompassed, and to a degree 
constructed by the self of the agent, … the domain of reason or 
mind or culture or theory.”10 The infinity of such an encounter 
speaks to the inability of my understanding to completely grasp 
the Other, and my inability ever to fully eradicate my responsi-
bility to the Other. In this ethical encounter, I concede my 
                                                
9 Michael L. Morgan. The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel 
Levinas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 69. 
10 Ibid., 44.  
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ability totally to grasp the world—my very identity becomes a 
response to the enigma that calls me into question and to 
selfhood. My subjectivity, therefore, is a response to a ques-
tion—one that is entirely foreign to me. In this sense, Levinas 
asserts that subjectivity is not rooted in autonomy; it is ontolog-
ically conditioned by something exterior to it—a preceding 
alterity. I gain myself because of the Other—as such, I am 
never fully transparent to myself.  
  It follows that the experiences whereby my very 
selfhood is at stake are of a different sort than the experiences 
that I understand through reason alone. Being able to grasp the 
beauty of a landscape in terms of an objective metric concerns 
the aesthetic properties of the landscape (Carlson and Carroll). 
However, an experience in nature that inaugurates my being at 
stake in it is of another kind—it is the stuff of sublimity.  
 I imagine I am perceiving a landscape through a 
detailed knowledge of the natural environment, or from behind 
a camera lens at an overlook. Emotionally or cognitively, I 
respond to the objects of perception as they appear—
aesthetically beautiful or complex. In doing so, I am totalizing 
these objects according to my conceptual judgment of them, as 
Levinas would say. I circumscribe, encompass, and construct 
the view. I view it in a way in which I can rationally compre-
hend it. I intend an aesthetic object whereby judgments of 
beauty, grandeur, etc. are of an objective quality because the 
judgments are made about the object alone. What changes, 
though, when I am 2000 ft. above ground on the side of a rock-
face, where I hang from a solitary anchor while rock-climbing? 
The aesthetic appreciation we are likely to feel here (should we 
dare to be there) is an altogether a different appreciation—one 
that may make me aware of my finitude, shudder at the incalcu-
lable perspective, or attempt to tell myself that anxiety is 
useless and I am not in danger. Any judgment I make will 
necessarily be relevant to or informed by my own subjectivi-
ty—my own inability to remove the feeling from my experienc-
ing of the sublime object. My experience with the natural 
sublime is one I cannot appreciate on a basis that removes my 
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subjectivity from the judgments—making them objectively the 
case.  
 François Marty says that “totality is a matter for reason 
and its satisfaction. Seeking the point at which differences rest 
upon a ‘same,’ where the quest for unity is appeased, whereas 
infinity is a matter for imagination.”11 Similarly, Matthew 
Sanderson explains how in Kant’s view reason fits into his view 
of the dynamical sublime. For Kant, the dynamical sublime 
“consists in the mental relationship between sensibility and 
reason that is excited by experiences of extremely powerful 
natural objects...”12 In experiencing the dynamical sublime, first 
we are fearful of being overwhelmed by the natural event so 
that we become aware of our finitude. The event is something 
that very well could crush us with absolute indifference. 
However, the pleasure that we feel at the very next instant 
supersedes the fear because our intellect has the ability to 
reason. According to Julian Young, then, we stand in a sort of 
imaginative distance with the object of sublimity in nature and, 
thereby, feel this “expansion of the self, a flowing out of the 
ego and into totality of things,” which Freud calls an “‘oceanic 
feeling.”13 
 Because the sublime involves a subjective feeling 
which synthesizes pleasure and displeasure towards a phenom-
enon, it does not warrant that a common aesthetic appreciation 
for both the naturally beautiful and naturally sublime. Young 
argues that “for a proper interpretation of the sublime, we need 
a different metaphysics,”14 but must we embrace a blooming 
buzzing confusion as a result? I think not. Jane Forsey de-
                                                
 
11 François Marty, “Height and the Sublime,” trans. by Jeffrey 
Bloechl, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 20 no. 2, (1998), 357. 
12 Matthew Sanderson, “Kant and Schopenhauer on Death and the 
Religious Sublime.” Contemporary Philosophy 28 no.3, (2008), 35. 
13 Julian Young, “Death and Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and 
Heidegger on the Sublime,” 140. 
14 Ibid., 141. 
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scribes the epistemic issue with treating the sublime like an 
object whose value is in its aesthetic properties when she says,  
 
The heart of the problem, then, is this: if we focus on 
the metaphysical status of the sublime object, our epis-
temology becomes problematic, but if we address in-
stead the epistemological transcendence of a certain 
experience, we still seem forced to make some meta-
physical claim about the object of that experience.15  
 
In order even to cognize the natural sublime we must first have 
some idea about how to describe the phenomenon. Here we are 
not totally without words. There is in fact a horizon of meaning 
involved here just as there is in recognizing the Other in her 
alterity. If there were not any horizon by which we could 
account for such alterity, then the phenomena which “inter-
rupt[s] our joyous possession of the world” would not interrupt 
because it could not be apprehended at all. Crucially, Levinas 
says that the Other “overflows” comprehension, not that the 
other is incomprehensible. In the same way, we can say that the 
natural sublime overflows our comprehension, not that it is 
incomprehensible. What is required, then, is an appreciation 
based on the tension between totality, because we do make 
judgments about the natural sublime, and infinity, because these 
judgments are always epistemically limited by subjectivity’s 
inability to grasp transcendence in absolution.  
 What would it look like to engage with the excess of 
the natural sublime without totalizing the phenomenon? In 
Overcoming Onto-Theology, Merold Westphal considers a 
similar question but in relation to religious existence. For 
Westphal, this problem of expressing excess, while not elimi-
nating the excess in the expression, occurs in the case of the 
metaphysical God which we have fully subsumed under our 
                                                
15 Jane Forsey, “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” JAC 65 no.4, 
(2007), 383.   
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own philosophical categories: “When we assume the adequacy 
of our concepts to the divine reality, we make ourselves the 
measure and master of that reality and convert it into the 
invisible mirror of our intellectual capacities.”16 Westphal 
warns, “when theology buys into this philosophical project, it 
renders the God of whom it speaks religiously useless.”17 In 
Martin Heidegger’s words, this is the God of philosophy and 
“man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music 
and dance before this god.”18 This reductionist tendency about 
which Westphal and Heidegger are both worried, is strikingly 
similar, I think, to an aesthetic objectivist appreciation of the 
natural sublime.  
 Westphal suggests that Levinas answers the question as 
to what God could come after postmodernism, saying, “We 
must think of God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to 
establish a relation irreducible to comprehension.” God 
construed this way is quite appropriately another name for the 
Other. Might we be more accurate in our judgments if we 
apprehend the sublime object in nature similarly? Though 
totalization is necessary, it is the burden of infinity imposed 
through subjectivity that gives it real value. In the same fashion, 
to totalize the experience of the sublime is to reduce the object 
of our gaze to its aesthetic properties—to value such experienc-
es through a reductionism—characteristic of aesthetic objectiv-
ism. What if the natural sublime were rethought, then, in such a 
way as to allow for a suspension of objectivist epistemologies 
in order to more appropriately gauge the object of the natural 
sublime? What would this object be if not a phenomenon 
available in full presence to my totalizing schemes? Appropriat-
ing Westphal, I think the answer is that the natural sublime 
                                                
16 Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: toward a postmod-
ern Christian faith, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001): 
269, my emphasis. 
17 Ibid., 261. 
18 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 72. Quoted by Westphal, 261. 
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becomes better understood as an invitation to existential 
reflection. 
 I do not mean to suggest that the natural sublime is the 
God of postmodernism, nor do I wish to equate the sublime 
experience or feeling to the Other or the infinity from which the 
Other calls forth. Rather, the paradigm is relevant because there 
are numerous examples in relation to which Kant, Schopenhau-
er, Burke, and others have struggled to communicate the 
essence of sublime experiences. How does one conceptualize 
transcendence, as such? The natural sublime is uniquely 
suitable to a phenomenologically religious discourse by means 
of a Levinasian frame because it highlights the existential 
traction of such an experience. It calls into question and at the 
same time reaffirms the existence of the self in relation to what 
is Other.  
 If, “the sublime is the experience of the excess of 
infinity over totality,”19 then the natural sublime takes on a new 
role—one that allows for an appreciation that judges such 
experiences not on their aesthetic properties, but their existen-
tial relevance. The natural sublime is not valuable because it is 
the activity of making life into an object of appreciation. 
Rather, it is invaluable as the activity of appreciating life as a 
subject living it. While the Other interrupts our “joyous 
possession of the world,” the sublime interrupts our joyous 
totalization of nature in the aesthetic objectivist attitude. The 
natural sublime understood as such may not lead us to God or 
replace our encounter with the Other, but it can provide us with 
an experience that inspires the awe and celebration that has 
traditionally been the province of the divine. The postmodern 
approach can help us better to understand and appreciate this 
existential dimension of the natural sublime—whether we are 
hanging off of the cliff or taking a picture of it from a distance. 
 
 
                                                
19 Marty, “Height and the Sublime,” 362. 
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